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1. PREAMBLE 
Resource rents are those earnmgs that only exist because of a scarce natural 
resopurce, or one whose quality is variable. The value of South Africa's fishing 
industry is naturally based on the rents that it generates. These, in turn, are based on 
the quality, demographics and quantity of the fish that make up the resource. 
Informed fisheries management requires knowledge of current rents, and of their 
potential to change, as well as understanding of fish stocks. For this reason the United 
Nations System of National Accounts has moved to include fisheries amongst the 
resources for which "satellite" accounts are compiled. These are "comprehensive 
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economic accounts" that integrate the value of natural resources into the existing 
national accounting framework. 
The benefits of such accounts are numerous and include: 
• better estimates of the impact of regulatory programs on productivity, 
• improved analysis of the costs and benefits of environmental regulation, 
• and more effective management of the nation's public lands and 
resources . 
• Augmented national accounts would also be valuable as indicators of 
whether economic activity is sustainable (Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg, 
1999 in Repetto, 2002: 245) 
Statistics South Africa committed itself to generating such satellite accounts, but has 
hitherto been unable to collect the necessary data. This report addresses the problem 
and derives a single-year estimate of resource rents in the sector. It demonstrates that, 
with enhanced information gathering and reporting, satellite accounts for fisheries can 
become regular and comprehensive - substantially enhancing the management of 
South Africa fish resources. 
A multi-year view of rent fluctuations across time, and between species, will provide 
a useful perspective on the health of fish stocks, and the potential economic benefits 
that could be realised. One important caveat is that resource rents, especially in the 
fishing sector, are volatile. Fishing costs rise and fall with fuel bills and fish stocks, 
which affect catch per unit effort. The movement of fish along the coastline also 
affects costs because processing plants are not similarly mobile. 
On the revenue side exchange rates have powerful impacts, especially on the high 
value export components of the industry. Because of this volatility, State managers 
have to see beyond the condition of the fish stock. They need to acknowledge that 
risks are high in the fishing industry, and build this into their management approach. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental imperative of the managers of South Africa's fisheries is necessarily 
the continued biological sustainability of the country's fisheries resources. This 
requires the assessment of these resources, an understanding of their interactions, 
monitoring of all harvesting and - ultimately - the introduction of measures to limit 
annual off-takes. 
Hicks raised the notion of economic sustainability in his definition of income as, "the 
maximum amount an individual can consume during a period and remain as well off 
at the end of the period as at the beginning". This statement, interpreted for fisheries 
management when stocks are depleted below the MEY, equates income with net 
harvest revenues with the proviso that the fish population be non-declining. 
The necessity that the resource be managed sustainably necessarily trumps other 
important objectives like the maximisation of resource rent, economic efficiency, 
social redistribution, job creation and poverty alleviation. These secondary objectives 
would be unattainable in the long run if the stocks were fished to non-recoverable 
levels. 
Ensuring the sustainability of the resource is often taken to mean the restriction of 
fishing effort to a level consistent with the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). This 
view is doubly flawed. Firstly a wide range of stock levels can be maintained 
sustainably. Secondly, if one wishes to maximise net benefits, the MSY is rarely 
equivalent to the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY). What is important is that South 
Africa's major commercial fish species have been harvested beyond both of these 
points. 
Only once sustainability has been ensured I can fisheries managers decide which 
secondary, alternative objectives could be realised. In South Africa, the structure of 
the fisheries sector and its relationship with the State via the Department of 
1 It must be noted that constraining effort to MSY wilI not guarantee sustainability - interaction 
between species, and other environmental considerations can play an important part in a stock decline, 
or even colIapse. 
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Environmental Affairs and Tourism's Marine and Coastal Management division 
(MCM) has an important role to play in this regard. At one extreme government can 
promote a lean, efficient, profitable fisheries sector, "which can be taxed to yield 
revenues that provide employment and meet development objectives elsewhere in the 
system." (BCLMEa, 2006: 2). It can alternatively coerce the industry into a higher 
cost, less efficient, but more labour-using system. "Despite these efficiency losses, 
this approach creates jobs directly and benefits those who have traditionally depended 
on the industry." (loc cit) 
The former approach would, presumably, be consistent with the maximisation of 
resource rents by restricting effort to a position where the MEY is realised2• The 
State could then maximise sustainable tax income from the fishing sector and use it to 
create jobs anywhere in the economy. 
The State can also intervene to reallocate wealth and income directly. Black 
Economic Empowerment initiatives and the reallocation of quota across the size 
distribution of firms - generally from larger to smaller firms and from older to newer 
firms - are cases in point. The existence of significant scale economies in harvesting, 
as well as processing and marketing, means that such restructuring efforts can impact 
directly on total rents. 
3. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S FISHERIES3 
The South African fishery is made up of around 20 species (BCLMEb 2006: 3) but 
this report is concerned with the seven major commercial species: Hake, Pilchard, 
Anchovy, West - and South Coast - Rock Lobster, Squid and Horse Mackerel. 
Fishing in South African waters is a high-risk activity. Catches, costs and product 
prices are all volatile, and future permit rights are uncertain. The industry therefore 
suffers from concurrent physical, market and political risks. 
2 This, incidentally, is the equivalent to the effort level a monopoly producer would operate at ~ this is 
discussed further in Section 5. 
3 This section was largely infonned by a research project the author completed, and updated, for the 
BCLME project in 2006: BCLMEa 
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Accordingly, catches in South African waters show considerable annual variation. 
This can be seen by looking at total catch statistics: thus just over 800 000 tons of fish 
were caught in South Africa in 2003, while in 1997 the catch was 45% lower at 445 
000 tons. 
In recent years there has also been considerable geographic variation: while the West 
Coast catch historically dominated South Africa's fishery, representing around 90% 
of the catch by volume, in recent years an increasing proportion of the catch has been 
captured off the South Coast.4 These changes in volume are especially true of the 
small pelagic fisheries - f short-lived species with high inter-annual variations in 
recruitment often associated with environmental perturbations. 
In South African waters the main stocks are certainly depleted, but by world standards 
are in reasonable condition, and the OMP system appears to be working well. Subject 
to the limitations on management before the introduction of 200 nautical mile EEZ 
South African commercial fish stocks have been historically well managed, primarily 
through catch and effort controls, and by utilising a strong research base. 
The research and management of the manne resources was traditionally a 
responsibility of the Sea Fisheries Research Institute (SFRI) with funding from the 
industry channelled through a stabilisation fund. The latter was necessary to correct 
for the effects of fluctuations in fishing rents. SFRI was subsequently incorporated 
into the division of Marine and Coastal Management, one of four divisions that make 
up the Dept. of Environment Affairs and Tourism. 
Since 1998 the fund has been known as the Marine Living Resources Fund. 
Unfortunately the industry rents captured for this fund are no longer solely targeted at 
the research and management of the fish stock; pollution control and a range of socio-
economic objectives also being funded by it. 
4 Since the processing plants are largely located on the West Coast, this has raised costs in the industry. 
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Responses to MOd's Long ]erm Rights Application process of 2004 indicate thm 
there are 1.432 entities operating in the, arious fishcrics relevant to thi s studvl_ 'IlJCy 
also indicate that there are 81,736 employees in the industry, although thi s ligurc 
includes part-time employees and some double-counting wocre workers arc employed 
in more than one fishery. It is also likely that some respondents may have inflated 
their employment estimates to paint their applications more fa,ourably. 
'1l1~ m()n:-re1iabl~ F~(ln"mic Sectoral Study e81Ima1e~ that direct empl()ym~nl in Ill<: 
Jisheri~~ 8e,lor 18 27,730 - <l8,uming foughty four dep<:ndanl~ per worhr, lhi~ m,:ans 
lhal ;;om~ 120J100 p<:()pl~ ar~ ,upp()rt~d by th~ fish~ric8 (Mather e/ 111, 2004). It also 
reports that there we're 4.669 lic~nsed Ilshing: ,,~s~eh in the ~nli,.~ South Ali-ican !led 
in 2000, I 969 of which were STlli!11. inshore line Ii~h ve~seb. 
The R~nguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem Project (llCLME) estimated that 
there were only 566 \es;;.ch liccn,cd, commercial vessels operated by quota holders in 
the Hah, Small Pelagics. Hore;.<: Mackerel and Rock Lobster fisheries (BCLMEb 
2006: 128). 
Figure I 
5 Table 2 in Section 7 d;:Laits the reb',nl ,"ot"", 
.. ,",," """'" 
. ,,"" 
""" _ ""I 
_ we "," 1 , .""" 
. '''''' 
Suutce: FtGIS. :'006 
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In 2004 fish products ranked 20th on the list of South Africa's exports by value - and 
South Africa had a 0,7% share of world fish product exports (TradeMap, 2006). 
While global exports in fish products grew by 6% between 2000 and 2004, the growth 
in South Africa's fish exports in the same period was more than double, at 13% (loc 
cit). 
In the late nineties, 100 000 tons of fish exports, worth roughly Rl billion, made up 
11,1% of South Africa's primary sector exports but only 1 % of total exports. By 
2004 the value of exports had more than doubled while the volume of exports 
increased by 20% - the percentage contribution to South Africa's exports remained 
roughly the same. The main destination for exports, at 25% by volume, is the Spanish 
market - the rest of the European Union receives over 15% of the exported product 
from South Africa. Roughly a quarter of all exports are bound for inter-regional 
markets, mainly the DRC, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and Mauritius (loc cit). 
By volume, South Africa imported more fish products than it exported over the period 
2000 to 2004 - on average 200,000 tons of fish, valued at RO,7 billion, were imported 
per year. The average value of an exported product (across all products) at RIO/kg 
was significantly higher than the average value of an imported product at R3,50/kg. 
This reflects a relatively competitive production advantage that indicates the 
sophistication of the South African fisheries production complex. This sophistication 
stems from the strength of the vertically integrated fishing companies which, for 
profit-margin maximisation reasons, focus on value-adding activities by importing 
non-processed bulk products and processing them into higher value specialised 
products. Because the distribution is in place, and local consumers are relatively 
unsophisticated in their demands, processing companies are able to satisfy the local 
market with cheap imported - or inferior local - fish products while exporting local 
whitefish, and a limited number of other products, at a premium. 
One example of trade imbalance that could impact regional development is the fact 
that, in 1999, supplies from neighbouring countries accounted for only 8% of import 
demand in South Africa - even when most of these countries demonstrated a 
considerably larger supply capacity. At the time South African trade and industry 
7 
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officials. in response 10 this fimiing , aS511r~J thai "urnier \h~ SADC Tr~J", pr01OCl)1, 
South Africa has conmlittcd 10 reduce. in a pha~"d-m:lnner, lmport l<ltin~ on u "ide 
range of Pl'Ouucts resulting in a d uly-Irce cntry of approximale! y 90"/, 0 r sub regional 
exports to South Africa" (International Trade Centre, 1':1<)9). 
By 200.J, hoWC\'OCf, this percentage hail actually decline to 7,5
'
%(Tradc\lap. 2ll0o) -
indica!ing both the ineffectiveness orllle SADe Trade protocol and th" decline of !ish 
stocks in Ni.IIllibi<l. 
3.1 Small Pelagic.1 
Sm,,11 Pelitgi($ Catch - 1950 -2004 
Ton. 
<,~u ]" .............................................. .-.., 
,~f-----
1000000 f----
o 
1 951l95l. 95a 959. %21 %50. %8l971197419771 g3Cl ~R:J. 9!l61. g3'l1 9~21 ~~'i'. ~~B!o{) 12004 
Souru FlUIS, 2(1110 
The Smull Pebgic fisher)' in Soulh Africa i~ traditionally the largest by volume 
1and~J, how~\'er, hath the tOlal catch volume and its species composition may vary 
signilicantly from year 10 year. Once purse seiocrs began to seriously larget anchovies 
Ihese fi~h rypicall} accounted lor 5()-OO% oj" the total small pelagic catch: this 
percentage declined to approximately 20"/, during the mid- 199Cls and then returned to 
its previou~ proportion~ (lntrac~n. 1 ':I9':1a). Th~ SADe FishNies lillit has defined the 
increase in the anelwvv calch in 21}O(l as a 'boom" (2004). Subsequently catches of 
pikh,tn.l rose in 2004 <lnd then IdJ-ofr. 
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Pilchard catches, on the other hand, remained relatively stable during the late 1990s 
after increasing significantly during the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1987, the pilchard 
catch accounted for 6% of the total pelagic catch - by 1997 this proportion had risen 
to 41% where it remained stable up until 2000. Thereafter catches rose sharply, 
processing capacity rather than stock abundance setting the limit on harvesting. Post 
2004 stocks both declined and shifted (to the South and East). 
The recovery of the South African pilchard stock in the period prior to the permit 
reallocation process appeared to allow broader access to the resource. The 
management of this reallocation process was a primary activity of MCM in the 
subsequent period and one of the major expenditures in its budget. Although a 
number of empowerment companies have entered the processing side of the industry, 
many new rights holders concentrate only on catching, and sell their catch to existing 
processors. 
The industry is vulnerable to the effects of fluctuations In total allowable catch 
(T AC), particularly because a number of operators are marginal concerns, and 
increased attention is being paid to eliminating paper quota holders. The small 
pelagic OMP recognises this variability and aims to minimise the impact of inter-
annual T AC fluctuations. The current management procedure in South Africa is based 
on a joint pilchard and anchovy quota, the allocation being topped up mid-way 
through the season should the resource justify it. 
Any switch from anchovy back to sardine raises the value of the small pelagic catch. 
Sardine offers the potential for extracting higher value-added oil, and focusing on 
quality rather than volumes since it can be either canned or processed into fishmeal 6. 
This pilchard premium underlay recent legal challenges to the small pelagic 
management system. 
6 Recent debate on the issue raises the suggestion that pilchard may be better utilised through value-
added by canning, rather then processing it into fishmeal (pers com: lapp 2006). 
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3.2 Hake 
Figure 3: Annual landings of Cape hakes (solid line) by all sectors in the hake fishery 
since 1917. 7 
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Source: MCM, 2005 
In South Africa, hake trawlers and small pelagic purse-seiners account for more than 
90% by weight of the total commercial fish caught, though hake is a significantly 
more valuable fish. 
Survey estimates show that hake populations (M. Paradoxus and M. Capensis) in 
South Africa were on a slight upward trend for the 20 years ending 2004 (see Figure 
3), but recent models suggest a decline in stocks. Catch rates have certainly fallen 
and the proportion of small fish (which bring in a lower price per tonne) in the 
population has risen. The result has been a sharp drop in the rents provided by these 
two species. 
7From 1978 the annual landing is apportioned between M. capensis and M. paradoxus based on a 
relationship between species ratio and fishing depth 
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Hake in South Africa is caught by bottom trawl, and to a lesser extent by long lining 
with a small hand-line catch. Long-lined hake is mostly landed wet (on ice) and sold 
whole or headed and gutted. Trawled hake can be landed wet (iced) or processed and 
frozen offshore. Products include headed and gutted, whole, filleted, skinless fillets 
and processed into value-added fish products, or white fishmeal. The optimal 
processing path depends on the size and quality of the fish, and on the technology 
used to catch it. 
When the medium term allocations were issued in 2003 there were 52 trawl right 
holders sharing a TAC of 126,687 tons and approximately 140 long-line rights 
holders entitled to 10,318 tons. The largest trawl allocation was 44,819 and the 
smallest 364 tons. All but three of the long-lining allocations were less than 100 tons 
with the largest of 719 tons allocated to a consortium but still with individual boat 
quotas that were under 100 tons. 
There was a levy of R165/ton in 2003 on both trawled and long-lined hake. In 
addition a license fee per vessel is charged. This fee was a sliding scale, but all boats 
greater than 20m paid Rl 260 in 2002. 
Access to the hake resource has broadened over time with two primary rights holders 
dominating the allocation before 1990. The situation changed in the early 90's to 
include up to ten rights holders, but the industry was still dominated by the two major 
companies. In the Medium term rights allocations for the period 2002 to 2005 the 
number of rights holders in the trawl sector increased to 54 and was decreased to 52 
with the allocation of long-term rights in 2006 (pers. Com. lapp, 2006). 
The broadening of access in the rights allocation processes occurred at the cost of the 
large enterprises that formed the historic core of the hake industry and remain the 
primary fish processors. These firms are also those best able to cope with the 
changing size distribution of the catch and to maintain their economic viability in the 
face of catch fluctuations. The redistribution policy has consequently had an 
opportunity cost on industry rents. 
11 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
rhe lAC for hake was introduced in 1978 , In 1983 the quota wa, 120 000 tons and 
then increa,ed upwards to 165 000 tons in 2002. In 2004 the South African hake 
industry was awarded the Marine Stewardship Council p.1SC) ,ta!ldard for 
sustainable fisheries - reflecting the perceived healthy state of the stock. 
Unfortunately the subsequcnt declines in catch rate and averuge size led to a cut in 
2005's TAC from 161 000 to 158000 tons. Tn 2006 the TAC was rurtherredu~ed to 
150,000 tons with a further 15000 tons reduction in 2007 to 135 000 tons. 
J.J W<tst Coast Rocll Lobsta 
West Coast Rock lobster 
o 
m •••••• Q •••• ",." ••••••••••••• 'M 
Yea r 
The total West Coast rod lobskr catch declined steadily from 5 924 tons in 1987 to a 
TAC of 1500 tons in 1995/6. Whik somc have attributed this decline to an unknown 
environmental an{)maly that al'f'<'ared to affect the somatic grov,th rute. it is al so 
possible that the onginal lobster growth rate. used to inf{)[m stock m"l1agement, was 
wrongl)' ~stimmed. Conservativc management has allowed some revi\'al of the stock 
and the TAC was up to 3527 t{)ns in 2l105. 
The commercial lobster industry in Southern Afi-ica has ocen geared towards exports 
since its inception. F,ee /ing has r~p l aced canning since thc Second World War. "I1d 
today rock lobster is exported in a runge {)f Jim11S. According to market preference 
these inclu<k; wllok cooked fnl/.cn, ""hole raw frozcn. frozen tail, and live, 
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Presently approximately 80% of the T AC is allocated to offshore harvesting, and the 
balances reserved for small-scale inshore fishers - noting that the west coast rock 
lobster T AC also accommodates an estimate for recreational fishers. The maximum 
individual quota here is 2 tons per annum. The number of these rights is, however, the 
subject of intense current debate and the appeals process has so far more than doubled 
the number of permits from that initially allocated under the medium term rights 
process. This is a high value product and an industry where annual harvests have 
fallen significantly over the years. 
3.4 Horse Mackerel 
A mid-water trawl fishery targets horse mackerel, a semi-pelagic speCIes that 
dominates the Namibian industry, but is less significant in South Africa. In South 
Africa the fishery for adult horse mackerel is found only off the Agulhas Bank where 
it is harvested by one large midwater vessel using midwater gear. Adults are also a 
by-catch of hake trawlers. 
Currently (2007) there are 18 rights holders in the Horse Mackerel fishery. Until 
recently a large Russian trawler catching for a number of quota holders dominated the 
fishery, but a large trawler owned by one of South Africa's largest fishing companies 
has superseded this vessel. The size of the mid-water trawl fleet is variable, with some 
of the hake trawl catching capacity being used to catch horse mackerel when 
circumstances permit. 
3.5 Squid 
The Eastern Cape is host to an important fishery targeting squid (Lo/igo vulgaris 
reynaudii). The fishery targets spawning aggregations using jigs. Almost the entire 
catch is exported; the South African product commanding a premium on world 
markets. After its initiation in 1983 the fishery grew rapidly until a permit system for 
vessels was introduced in 1987 to limit fishing effort. In 2003 128 medium term rights 
were issued comprising 2 400 fishers on 138 boats. As the fishery is input-controlled, 
catches fluctuate from year to year, sometimes as high as 12000 tons and in other 
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years as low as 4000 tons. The resource is protected by a closed season of 3 to 5 
weeks when spawning is at its peak (usually November). 
3.6 Other Fisheries8 
Abalone 
South Africa's commercial abalone fishery remained relatively stable for many years, 
being controlled by a whole mass quota of some 600 tons. The fishery is divided into 
seven fishing zones, but most of the commercial catch is harvested from only five. A 
T AC is set for each zone. Other means of protecting the resource are a closed season 
and a minimum legal size limit of 114 mm. Licensed commercial divers operate from 
small boats and use the "hookah" system of air supply, in which a portable 
compressor channels air through reinforced hosepipe. Most of the catch is canned or 
frozen and exported to the Far East, although legislation stipulates that 10 percent 
must be sold in South Africa. 
The lucrative market in the Far East has in recent years stimulated an escalation in 
illegal fishing activity. At the same time the number of recreational divers increased. 
Because of the poaching and the sharp decline in the biomass, the recreational fishery 
was stopped in 2003 and the commercial fishery has been sharply decreased with a 
TAC of237 tons in 2004. Rights in this sector were renewed in the 2003/2004 season 
for 10 years. 
Line Fishing 
The South African line fishery is split into three main components: the hake handline 
fishery, the tuna fishery and the general recreational and commercial line fishery. 
The commercial fishery for tuna began in 1960. Although poling, is the primary 
means of exploitation targeting albacore tuna and to a lesser extent yellowfin tuna, 
longlines are also significant. South African tuna catches approximate 4 000 to 6 000 
tons per year. The fishery is seasonal, from September through to March. It is now 
believed that total Atlantic Ocean albacore catches exceed the maximum sustainable 
8 Infonned by Japp pers com, 2007 
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yield of 25,000 tons and are not sustainable. South Africa is a full member of the 
International Commission for Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and is presently lobbying for 
the allocation of country allocations. 
Catches in the commercial line fisheries peaked at 18 000 to 20 000 tons in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, but then declined steadily to an estimated 7 300 tons in 1985. 
This was despite an increase in fishing effort as smaller, faster and more transportable 
ski boats replaced the earlier line boats. The newer vessels enabled fishers to 
concentrate effort where fish were available and to follow migratory species along the 
coast, so effectively increasing pressure on the declining resource. The dropping 
catches, together with a decrease in the mean sizes of fish caught, led to calls for the 
protection of linefish stocks, and in 1984 the South African Marine Linefish 
Management Association was formed. 
Today management measures include minimum size limits, bag limits, closed seasons 
and closed areas (marine reserves), but catch rates continue to decrease as the 
numbers of fishers (commercial and recreational) rise annually. A crisis has been 
declared in the fishery, allowing the Minister to take appropriate action to protect 
stocks. Certain species have been protected and numbers of fishers in the sector were 
drastically reduced with the medium-term allocations in 2003 (137 rights issued). 
Presently there is a Total Allowable Effort (TAE) of 450 boats with 3 450 fishers. 
Tuna, shark and swordfish long line is a developing sector in South Africa. 
Historically Foreign effort (mostly Japan and Taiwan Province of China) has 
dominated with about 130 permits issued annually. The issuing of foreign flag permits 
to longline for tuna has been terminated. 
After an experimental fishing period, long-term fishing rights for directed effort on 
tuna (30 rights) and swordfish (20) were issued in November 2004 to South African 
rights holders. Many of these rights are presently fished by foreign flag operators in 
joint venture with the South African rights holders with the main objective of 
increasing South Africa's catch history for tunas. 
The small shark-directed longline fishery has been integrated into the large pelagic 
longline sector and from 2006 pelagic shark longline rights will cease. However, a 
small demersal (bottom) longline shark fishery will be permitted. 
15 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Other 
Other manne fisheries include several small coastal net fisheries, wild oyster 
exploitation and a small trawl fishery on the Natal coast for prawns. These fisheries 
are also included in the long-term rights allocation process. The policies developed 
for sectors such as for oysters and beach seine focus on small-scale and coastal 
community fishers. 
Subsistence and artisanal fisheries are located mostly in rural areas, including the 
former Transkei and KwaZulu-Natal coastlines where activities such as oyster and 
mussel picking occur. In some areas there are also permits for subsistence fishers for 
the harvesting of rock lobster and abalone. 
4. NATIONAL ACCOUNTS & NATURAL RESOURCES 
The United Nations has led a global effort to embed the concept of sustainable 
development into the System of National Accounts (SNA). This proposed reform of 
the national accounting system is directed by the Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Accounting Handbook 2003 (SEEA). This paper follows the guidelines laid 
out in the UN's Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting for Fisheries 
Handbook (SEEAF); that sets out to provide 
a common framework for organizing economic and environmental information 
related to fisheries, permitting the monitoring of the economic importance of 
fisheries, the improvement of fisheries management and the estimation of the 
full costs and benefits offisheries. (United Nations, 2004: 5) 
The establishment of a satellite account for fisheries will allow the national accounts 
to quantify the value of the natural resource itself, rather than merely quantifying the 
value of its depletion. Traditional national accounts record the mining and harvesting 
of natural resources as income, and take no account of the degradation of the 
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resource, or even the value of the remaining natural capital. A satellite account for 
fisheries would treat natural resource depletion as capital depreciation rather than as 
income, and the accumulation of natural resources as investment rather than forgone 
earnmgs. 
The formation of a fisheries satellite account in South Africa will bring a broad range 
of benefits to fisheries managers and, ultimately, the managers of the country's 
economy. The SEEAF defines three broad sets of issues that can be addressed with 
information from the fisheries account, namely: monitoring the economic importance 
of fisheries, improving fisheries management, and estimating the full costs and 
benefits of fisheries (United Nations, 2004). These are expanded upon in Table 1, 
below: 
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Table 1 
Issues that can be addressed with Fisheries Accounts 
Contribution to national income, employment and foreign exchange 
earnings of fisheries and its sub sectors 
Distribution of benefits from fisheries among different groups in society, 
e.g., commercial, recreational, and subsistence fisher 
Economic linkages between the fisheries sector and other sectors of the 
economy 
Value of natural assets, in particular commercial fish stocks, and the cost 
of depletion 
Value of fisheries resources shared with other countries 
Monitoring implementation of international instruments (e.g., UN Law of 
the Sea, UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries) 
Assess the economic efficiency of fishing in the sub sectors, and the 
potential value of fish under alternative management and policies. 
Fisheries management can then be compared to management of other 
resources in the economy 
Assess government policies, such as fisheries taxes and subsidies, on 
incentives for sustainable utilization of fishery resources, on the 
distribution of access to fisheries and benefits from fisheries. Again, 
fisheries policies and management can be compared to other resources in 
the economy 
Assess the impact of macro-economic policies on the fisheries sector, 
such as economy-wide changes in taxes or interest rates. Are fisheries 
especially vulnerable to specific policies? 
Monitoring the inter-relationship between fisheries, the natural resource 
base and ecosystem health 
Management of resources shared with other countries, including on the 
high seas. 
Assess the extent of resource rent recovered by the government, accrued 
to the private sector, or dissipated on overcapacity and over fishing 
Assess the extent of government fisheries management costs and habitat 
protection costs 
Assess environmental externalities caused by fisheries, or generated 
elsewhere in the economy and borne by fisheries (measured in both 
physical and monetary terms) 
Source: UNITED NATIONS, 2004 (17) 
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In addition to these benefits, a properly constructed and functioning set of fisheries 
accounts would indicate the potential benefits of policies that offer short-term 
alternative opportunities to fishermen in depleted fisheries. 
This report has rather more modest ambitions than those laid out above, but the 
importance of a 'first-run' investigation of the feasibility of fisheries accounts in 
South Africa - as well as an initial, single-year estimate of the national resource rent 
from the major fisheries, and interpretation of their management implications - should 
not be underestimated. 
The SEEAF provides a set of standard approaches to developing fisheries accounts, 
and this study attempts to use one such methodology to calculate the physical 
account, as well as the monetary account, for the major South African fisheries 
(United Nations, 2004). 
The estimation of such accounts is a relatively difficult endeavour, even in countries 
with well-established records of fishery statistics. The reason is that fish, unlike 
forests, for example, are not directly observable. This means that stocks need to be 
estimated using sample testing, biological knowledge and mathematical extrapolation. 
Many fish species interact in ways which affect stocks, and these interaction can be 
very difficult, and costly, to model. 
South Africa has the added challenge of an uneven record of fisheries data. There is 
no regular survey of fishing companies, and Marine and Coastal Management only 
recently recommenced publishing official catch data, after a hiatus of several years. 
Until recently many researchers have relied on data from George Warman - a private 
sector publisher, which puts out some semi-official figures in their annual Fishing 
Industry Handbook - for economic and sectoral information. MCM has, in the past, 
produced an economic review of the South African fisheries; these reviews have not 
been produced in recent years and the historical reports are outdated. 
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5. RESOURCE RENT: data and calculation 
The resource rent of a fishing company is the return it receives over and above its 
opportunity costs. In other words, it is the revenue in excess of that needed to cover 
the costs of catching and a return on capital just sufficient to keep the firm in the 
industry over the long run. This rent is attributable to the scarcity of the fish, either 
due to limits in the stock, or to restrictions on fishing. A naIve Schaefer model can be 
used for heuristic purposes to show how such rents accrue and how they can be 
dissipated. 
Figure 3 is the financial representation of a Schaefer curve that plots the yield of a 
fish resource against the effort put into harvesting that resource. It shows that, as 
effort increases, so does the yield of the resource - up until effort level E2, where the 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is reached. 
Figure 3 
....... i u: 
........ 
t; 
o 
u 
E1 
MSY 
E2~ ____ ~E=3~ __________ ~ 
Effort 
Source: DIFID, 2006 
Beyond this point, as effort increases, so the yield of the fishery decreases. Resource 
rent is represented by the vertical distance between the revenue curve (R) and the cost 
curve (C). If viewed in a single time period the maximum rent is realised at effort 
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level E1 - the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) which represents a lower effort 
level than that which reaps the MSY. 
If the distorting effects of interest rates are omitted, then were fishery harvested by a 
monopoly with long term sole rights over the resource, that firm would rationally 
operate at effort level E 1. Here it would maximise its profitablity. However, in a 
fishery where competition is permitted and entry is possible, more firms will enter the 
market, adding to the total effort levels until point E3 is reached, where they will be 
making a normal profit only, i.e. just covering their accounting and imputed costs. At 
this point the economic rents have been dissipated by excessive effort. This has raised 
industry costs and lowered yields. The economic rent is zero and the fishery is both 
biologically and economically overexploited with a harvesting effort level ofE3. 
This outcome: that a monopoly producer represents both the optimal economic and 
biological solutions for a supply-side market, runs contrary to most classical 
economic conclusions. The implication of this is that a fisheries manager should, 
ideally, maximise the economic rent realised by a fishery by constraining effort to 
point E 1 - effectively replicating a monopoly situation, but doing so through an 
efficient allocation process. In a perfect world this would be accomplished setting an 
effort limit of E1 (or a TAC equivalent to it) within the context of a competitive 
marketplace. Sadly this has proved almost impossible to replicate anywhere in the 
world. 
In effect, for a "new" fishery with no history of prior fishing, a monopoly fishery with 
guaranteed long term rights is likely to be the most economically, and socially 
efficient industrial structure, requiring no regulation or management by the State 
whatsoever. Of course, social and historical realities mean that this is hardly ever the 
case, especially in a country with as long a fishing history as South Africa. 
6. METHODOLOGIES 
The SEEA includes mari- and aquaculture, as well as fresh water, and recreational 
fisheries in its guidelines for fisheries accounts. Due, in part, to the lack of data 
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available on the South African fisheries mentioned above9, this study focuses only on 
the major fish species and their associated fisheries. The resources covered do, 
however, constitute the vast majority of the South African fisheries, by volume and 
value. 
5.1 Physical Accounts 
The physical accounts show the status of the fish stocks in the period under question 
by listing the opening stock, the changes in the stock and the closing stock. The major 
change from economic activity is the annual catch. According to the guidelines in the 
SEEAF "other changes in the volume of assets include catastrophic losses but also the 
net natural growth of the stock, births or recruitment minus natural mortality." 
This paper follows the convention set by Lange (2003). Her approach recognised the 
lack of information that is the norm in fisheries, it therefore collapsed recruitment, 
natural mortality and other volume changes, into the category: 'Other Volume 
Changes'. It should be noted, however, that annual stock assessments are carried out 
for the majority of commercial fish species and that a rigorous scientific approach is 
generally followed that estimates stock parameters and the fisheries managed by a 
suite of management options that include both input (effort) and output (TAC) 
controls. 
5.2 Monetary Accounts 
The monetary accounts mirror the physical accounts in structure, but specify the value 
of the stock and changes in the stock. Economic theory describes the value of a fish 
stock as the present value of the stream of rents it is expected to generate in the 
foreseeable future. 
If an economic asset - quota to catch fish, in this case - is freely traded, the price 
9 South Africa lacks a regular survey of the fishing industry. The recommendation, contained in 
2003's Economic and Sectoral Study of the South African Fishing Industry commissioned by the South 
African government in 2001 to establish a Fisheries Information System (FIS), is still in the process of 
development. 
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realised if that asset is sold should be that asset's value, or the discounted value of the 
stream of profits or rents it is expected to generate. In markets where Individual 
Transferable Quotas (lTQ) are used to manage a fishery the trading price of the quota 
should reflect a slightly conservative asset value of the targeted fish population. In 
reality, as the SEEAF handbook points out, "relatively few fisheries are managed 
through ITQs, and thus such quota markets do not exist. Even when ITQs are used, 
the market may be 'thin' or subject to other constraints that distort the quota price" 
(United Nations, 2004:28) 
The management framework in South Africa technically precludes the trading of 
quota. That said, some trading does occur informally and anecdotal reports of the 
prices agreed on provide some scope for comparison with other methodologies of rent 
calculation. 'Paper quota' transactions have been a feature of the industry for the past 
decade and may offer some insights. Even where paper quota is not traded, rights are 
often bought and sold, giving an indication of the price - and hence the rent - of the 
resource. This comparison is made in Section 10. 
Most commonly, the residual approach is used, whereby rent - which can be defined 
as the value of production minus the marginal exploitation costs - is calculated as the 
difference between revenue (or value of production) and costs. In actual 
implementation average cost is used rather than marginal cost because data about 
marginal costs are not generally available. This practice may introduce an upward 
bias into the measure of rent because average cost is usually lower than marginal cost. 
(United Nations, 2004: 41) 
The residual approach depends on a comprehensive data source. Most rent 
calculations use information from existing national accounts but, unfortunately, South 
Africa's accounts lack detailed information on the fishing industry. Consequently the 
resource rent calculation in this paper is based on information from a fishing industry 
survey. 
7. DAT A SOURCE 
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The most comprehensive recent survey done was the Economic and Sectoral Study of 
the South African Fishing Industry in 2002 (ESS). The data in this survey is, 
however, 5 years old already thus, it was decided to use data from MCM's Long Term 
Rights Allocation Process (LTRAMP) from 2005. 
As part of this process existing and potential new fishing entities were invited to 
apply for long-term fishing rights by fillling in one of 20 application forms for 
catching rights to species divided into 4 clusters. The clusters, and associated species, 
are listed in Table 2, below. 
Table 2. 
MCM's LONG TERM RIGHTS ALLOCATION PROCESS 2005: CLUSTERS 
CLUSTER SPECIES/FISHERY INCLUDED IN STUDY 
Hake Deep Sea Trawl Yes 
Hake Inshore Trawl Yes 
Horse Mackerel Yes 
Cluster A Small Pelagics Yes Patagonian Toothfish No 
South Coast Rock Lobster Yes 
KwaZulu-Natal Prawn No Trawl 
Hake Long Line Yes 
West Coast Rock Lobster Yes (OffShore) 
Cluster B Squid Yes 
Seaweed No 
Tuna Pole No 
Demersal Shark No 
Handline Hake Yes 
Cluster C West Coast Rock Lobster Yes (Near Shore) 
Beach Seine (Treknet) and No Gillnet (Drift Net, Set Net) 
Cluster D KZN Sardine Beach Seine No 
Oysters No 
White Mussels No 
Cluster Unknown Traditional Linefish No 
Source: LTRAMP Database, 2005 
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Those species included in the study constitute the majority of the South African 
fisheries by value and by volume. Those not included generally did not have 
sufficient up-to-date data available to complete the rent calculation. 
For reasons of confidentiality MCM provided raw data rolled up to the species/fishery 
level. While companies who had not been allocated rights were also invited to apply, 
the data was limited to that from applicants already in possession of quota or permit. 
Given honesty in the applications, the data should not, therefore, show any upward 
bias. In total, 1432 relevant applications were analysed. The resource rent is 
calculated for 2004, the year that the 2005 Rights Allocation Process treated as the 
test case, meaning that the full breadth of data was gathered only for this year. 
While most of the data seems sound, there were clear problems with data fields 
requiring volume estimates - many of the results seemed unrealistically high. It is 
presumed that some companies provided volume in 'kilograms', as opposed to the 
'tons' specified. As such, no volume data is utilised in the rent calculation. This data 
is in the process of being 'cleaned' and should in time become available to the staff at 
Stats SA who are commencing work on satellite accounts for the fishing industry. 
Where volume data were required they were consequently taken from the annual 
stock assessment workshops and the ongoing outcomes of the modelling underlying 
the aMPs that drive current quotas 10• The data used to construct the physical accounts 
are also taken from this source. 
Prices are calculated from information on landings and turnover, arising from the 
quota allocation, for each fishery. Operating costs for each fishery have been divided 
into variable costs like Intermediate Consumption and Compensation of Employees, 
and fixed costs including consumption of Fixed Capital and a 'Normal Return' on 
Capital Stock. 
This division could be seen as an oversimplification in the fishing industry where 
certain variables have a fixed, and a variable, component. 'Compensation of 
10 Run by the MARAM research unit, Dept of Applied Mathematics, UCT. 
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Employees', for example, is fixed in part by South Africa's mInImUm wage 
legislation. However, the actual earnings of workers on the boats are also tied to catch 
levels, similar to the piecework wages found in manufacturing elsewhere in the world, 
indicating a significant variable component to labour cost. 
Another example is related to the consumption of fixed capital: while this is classified 
as a fixed cost, it includes a variable component related to the intensity of use of the 
asset, as well as the traditional fixed component related to the fact that the asset is a 
sunk cost that has a fixed depreciation path. 
Recognising these problems, the resource rent IS calculated usmg the following 
formula: 
Equation 1 
Ri = TR' - (Ie' + CE i + CFe' + Nr) 
NP' = JrxK' 
Where R = resource rent 
TR = total revenue 
IC = intermediate consumption 
CE = compensation of employees 
CFC = consumption of fixed capital ( depreciation) 
NP = normal profit 
7t = the rate of return on capital, considered the opportunity cost of capital 
K = the value of fixed capital stock invested in the industry 
For each fishery, i, where i = 1,2,3,4,5,6 for Hake, Small Pelagics, West Coast Rock 
Lobster, South Coast Rock Lobster, Squid and Horse Mackerel. 
Source: SEEAF: 65 
6.1 Intermediate Consumption 
Intermediate Consumption IS defined as the "value of the goods and servIces 
consumed as inputs by a process of production, excluding fixed assets whose 
consumption is recorded as consumption of fixed capital." (United Nations, 2004: 
26 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
182). The data source used in this paper does not include a detailed breakdown of 
costs. As such, intermediate costs were estimated following on an economic model 
developed by the Namibian Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, and adjusted 
for the South African market. In Namibia, Intermediate costs - mainly fuel - account 
for 38% of the value of output (Lange). 
South African fishing firms have a similar cost structure except that levies and 
transport and processing costs are lower, while labour costs are higher. On average, 
intermediate costs are lower in South Africa. For example, on average the cost of fuel 
and ice made up approximately 23% of the landed value of Small Pelagics in 2005, 
down from 32% in 2000 (de Swart, 2006). Even including other intermediate costs, 
this falls short of the proportion in the Namibian fishery. It is estimated that 
intermediate costs in South Africa, dominated by fuel costs, are approximately 35% 
of output across the board (Japp: pers com 2006). 
Intermediate consumption estimates from the national input/output tables were also 
investigated. These are described in detail in the macro-economic assessment and its 
appendix. 
6.2 Fixed capital 
Fixed capital is identified as the book value of the fixed assets in the fishing industry. 
Those firms applying for long-term rights also disclosed their gross asset value and 
the insured value of their asset base. Because both measures would over-inflate the 
asset value, and the former wasn't broken down into land- and sea-based assets, the 
book value figures were used. 
Anecdotal evidence and a few empirical studies 11, suggest that actual depreciation, at 
least with regard to the sea-based assets, could be hyperbolic - rather than traditional 
straight-line depreciation, these assets decline in value rapidly at first, and then at an 
ever-slowing rate. Effectively the value of a vessel declines as an asymptote and 
never becomes zero. 
11 See example below 
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Figure .. shows the results of a study of the depreciation of vessels in the Sotllh 
Ali-ican West Coast Lohster fishery. Th~ d~preciatiol1 ralc approximates straight-line 
depreciation until around 20 vcars where after it extends, Ln a hyperbolic fashion. 
beyond sixty }ears. 
FigLlre 4. 
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The SEEAF Handbook identifies three main methods of calculating the opportunity 
cost of capital including: an estimation of the net operating surplus generated from the 
capital stock of the particular industry in question, the financing cost of the capital, or 
the opportunity cost of investment in the capital stock. 
The first method usually requires the identification of a comparative industry with 
similar performance characteristics, and the second requires an assessment of 
measurable long term borrowing in the fishing industry. Because there is no obvious 
industry for comparison and no significant long-term borrowing in the industry, an 
opportunity cost needs to be identified. 
Lange uses a 20 per cent rate of return in a study of the Namibian fisheries. This is 
justified "because of the very high risk due to unpredictable factors affecting the fish 
stock that business must be compensated for" (2003). This paper evaluates the 
resource rent given two different rates of return - 10% as the main rate, and 20% as a 
sensitivity analysis to assess rents if businesses are to be compensated for a higher 
risk factor in the fishing industry. 
6.4 Vertical Integration 
South Africa's fishing industry is characterised by extensive vertical integration 
between catch and processing with many firms extending their operation throughout 
the value chain. Because of this, and in line with the SEEAF's recommendation that, 
in the case of vertical integration "a true estimate of resource rent may only be 
obtainable if the boundary between the fishing and fish processing industries is 
relaxed and the residual method is applied to both activities," the primary industry 
and the processing industry were combined in this analysis. 
A glance at the value chains in the industry will indicate that the average rents in the 
actual harvesting of fish are typically low. There are 'good years', but access to a 
permit is no guarantee of future wealth as the number of failed fishermen attests. 
Profit - as opposed to rent - is made further up the value chain. Appendix 2 
reproduces the value chains for Small Pelagics and Horse Mackerel to show how far 
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up the value chain the majority of profits are realised. 
8. MEASURING ASSET VALUE 
The value of a fish stock is the net present value of the rent it will generate in the 
future. In its full form this present value equation requires projections of: 
• Future prices 
• Technology 
• Costs of Production 
• Fish Stock Levels 
• Resource Exploitation Paths (Lange, 2003:8) 
Because information on the first three of these variables is not usually available, the 
convention has been to assume that they remain constant and to rely only on the last 
two variables. 14 
The SEEAF handbook details three possible long-run outcomes for future stock 
levels, which must assume constant effort/exploitation: the first is that stock levels 
remain constant, as does the associated resource rent; the second is that stocks rise 
over time, as does resource rent; the third is that stocks decline with time until they 
collapse and rent goes to zero. 
The goal of fisheries management is to increase fish stocks, or maintain them at a 
sustainable level, so the third option is not a viable management outcome. Regarding 
the second option, the SEEAF notes that, 
governments usually change management when a fish stock faces collapse in an 
attempt to restore the stock to previous high levels, but whether they succeed 
depends on three factors: (a) that the fish decline is, in fact, reversible; (b) that 
14 It should be noted that costs of production, although assumed constant, in this model, vary 
considerably over time. These costs are strongly positively related to oil prices, which are notoriously 
volatile, they are also inversely related to stock abundance. 
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fisheries manager have sufficient knowledge of the fish dynamics to design 
effective measures to restore the fish stock; and (c) that there is a credible 
commitment by managers to policy changes, which may be politically very 
difficult. Most fisheries have not recovered as often, or as quickly, or to the 
levels that managers have set as objectives. (56) 
Accordingly, it rejects the likelihood of option two, leaving what it calls "the most 
commonly used assumption - that fish stocks remain constant. 
This means that the net present value equation takes a "reduced form" as shown in 
Equation 2. 
Equation 2. 
Assuming that fish are harvested at a constant, sustainable rate in perpetuity: 
VC' = R' Ir 
Where VC' is the value of the resource stock at the close of period t 
R' is the total rent at time t 
r is the discount rate, 10% for these calculations 
For each fishery, i, where I = 1,2,3,4,5,6 for Hake, Small Pelagics, West Coast Rock 
Lobster, South Coast Rock Lobster, Squid and Horse Mackerel. 
Source: Lange (2006:8) 
The discount rate used in Equation 2 is the social discount rate rather than the private 
discount rate. The former is generally lower than the latter for several reasons, 
outlined by the SEEAF Handbook, including: the existence of positive externalities 
which private savings decisions do not take into account, taxation and the difference 
in risk premia between small private enterprises which cannot really spread risk, and 
the State which can, and also runs a far lower risk of default. 
Table 4 provides several examples of discount rates used to calculate fisheries asset 
value in other countries: 
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Table 4 
Country Discount rate 
Iceland 8% 
Namibia 10% 
Norway 3.5% 
United Kingdom 4% 
United States 3% 
Source: SEEAF: 58 
For South Africa, a social discount rate of 10% (real) is usually used, to reflect a risk 
profile substantially different to that in developed countries. 
The state guidelines for economic evaluations of projects in South Africa suggest that 
a sensitivity analysis be used. The traditional standard figure was 8% real but many 
recent papers replaced this with numbers as high as 10% or even 12% to show that 
marginal state projects were not competing with the private sector for scarce funds. 
Although this case is somewhat different, fishing remams a typically high-risk 
business where hurdle rates are set far higher than in most land based operations. 
Industry interview indicate that the 10% used in this paper is therefore not high. 
9. PHY~CALACCOUNTS 
The physical accounts for the last eight to fifteen years appear below. The Small 
Pelagic fishery is the only one that has experienced increased biomass levels over the 
period. Most species appear to have shown significant variability in biomass levels 
between years, highlighting the difficulty in managing catch rates. 
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7.1 Hake 
Table 5. 
'000 Tons Opening Catch Other Volume Closing Biomass Biomass Changes 
1990 425 137 135 423 
1991 423 141 145 427 
1992 427 142 149 434 
1993 434 141 166 459 
1994 459 147 184 496 
1995 496 141 138 493 
1996 493 159 150 483 
1997 483 148 135 471 
1998 471 154 122 438 
1999 438 137 88 389 
2000 389 155 142 376 
2001 376 159 174 392 
2002 392 147 149 393 
2003 393 155 145 383 
2004 383 154 136 365 
2005 365 144 125 347 
Source: MARAM research unit, Dept of Applied Mathematics, VCT 
Hake biomass grew marginally in the early-nineties but began a gradual downward 
trend from 1995 to the present. The catch has remained relatively stable at around 
147 000 tons. 
7.2 Small Pelagics 
Table 6. 
'000 Tons Opening Catch Other Volume Closing Biomass Biomass Changes 
1991 1097 202 1282 2177 
1992 2177 401 282 2059 
1993 2059 286 182 1954 
1994 1954 249 91 1796 
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1995 1796 285 126 1636 
1996 1636 146 137 1627 
1997 1627 177 646 2096 
1998 2096 236 755 2615 
1999 2615 313 2210 4512 
2000 4512 403 2758 6868 
2001 6868 479 1590 7979 
2002 7979 474 280 7785 
2003 7785 549 -519 6717 
2004 6717 564 -126 6027 
2005 6027 529 -950 4547 
Source: MARAM research unit, Dept of Applied Mathematics, VCT 
Small Pelagic stocks have been extremely variable in the last fifteen years with the 
species experiencing almost 400 per cent growth from the chronically low levels of 
the nineties to 2002, when biomass peaked. Over this period the 'environmental' 
changes represented by "Other Volume Changes" have shown high volatility with the 
species recently experiencing decline in biomass levels that have even exceeded the 
total catch. This highlights the difficulties in managing the small pelagic fishery in 
South Africa. 
7.3 WCRL 
Table 7. 
Tons Opening Catch Other Volume Closing Biomass Biomass Changes 
1996 27035 2670 2651 27016 
1997 27016 2758 1844 26102 
1998 26102 2541 2412 25972 
1999 25972 3175 5477 28275 
2000 28275 2513 3558 29320 
2001 29320 3041 3957 30235 
2002 30235 3545 915 27606 
2003 27606 3738 957 24825 
2004 24825 4025 1459 22259 
Source: MARAM research unit, Dept of Applied Mathematics, VCT 
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West Coast Rock Lobster biomass has been reasonably stable over the last eight years 
with a moderate decline in biomass levels and a significant recent increase in the 
catch. This species also shows a degree of variability with regard to environmental -
or "Other Volume" - Changes 
7.4 SCRL 
Table 8. 
Tons Opening Catch Other Volume Closing Biomass Biomass Changes 
1996 3161 443 445 3164 
1997 3164 416 469 3216 
1998 3216 516 471 3171 
1999 3171 512 431 3089 
2000 3089 423 361 3027 
2001 3027 288 296 3035 
2002 3035 340 256 2951 
2003 2951 350 234 2834 
2004 2834 382 236 2688 
Source: MARAM research unit, Dept of Applied Mathematics, UeT 
There has been a modest decline in South Coast Rock Lobster biomass over the last 
eight years. Reported catch rates have also remained relatively stable over the period. 
7.5 Squid 
Table 9. 
Tons Opening Catch Other Volume Closing Biomass Biomass Changes 
1993 7923 6586 10092 11429 
1994 11429 6928 5909 10410 
1995 10410 7189 6564 9785 
1996 9785 7261 5127 7651 
1997 7651 4146 4293 7798 
1998 7798 6801 8401 9398 
1999 9398 7236 5942 8104 
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2000 8104 6686 4780 6198 
2001 6198 3346 4606 7458 
2002 7458 7273 9556 9741 
2003 9741 9027 6952 7666 
2004 7666 10396 9799 7069 
Source: MARAM research unit, Dept of Applied Mathematics, UCT 
The Squid fishery has experienced the most dramatic fluctuations in biomass and 
catch of all of the species analysed over the past ten years. Catch rates have changed 
by over 110 per cent in some years, and the biomass levels have also shown 
extremely variability with a downward trend over time. 
7.6 Horse Mackerel 
Table 10. 
'000 Tons Opening Catch Other Volume Closing Biomass Biomass Changes 
1990 728 52 19 694 
1991 694 38 28 685 
1992 685 36 39 688 
1993 688 32 39 694 
1994 694 18 32 708 
1995 708 9 32 730 
1996 730 28 31 733 
1997 733 36 21 718 
1998 718 55 17 680 
1999 680 22 12 670 
2000 670 23 27 673 
2001 673 32 34 676 
2002 676 24 35 687 
2003 687 33 37 691 
2004 691 43 41 689 
Source: MARAM research unit, Dept of Applied Mathematics, UCT 
While biomass levels have been comparatively stable over the past 14 years in the 
Horse Mackerel fishery, catch levels have been relatively variable with catch levels in 
1995 dropping to 17 per cent of their 1990 levels before recovering almost fully by 
2004. 
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10. MONETARY ACCOUNTS 
Table 11 provides the summary results of the resource rent calculation for the South 
African fisheries for 2004. The detailed results are to be found in Appendix 1. 
Table 1115. 
Resource Resource Rent per Asset Value 
2004 Rent Rent (mil) Ton -10% (R mil) (mil) - -20% oee 
10% oee oee 
Total Hake 551 446 3571 5514(41%) 
Deep Sea 3242 4311 Trawl 431 342 
Inshore 6333 633 Trawl 63 58 
Longline -14 -26 nla nla 
Small Pelagics 310 249 549 3 097 (23%) 
WCRL 297 281 73676 2965 (22%) 
SCRL 36 33 95046 363 (3%) 
Squid 117 93 16088 1 170 (9%) 
Horse 
n/a n/a Mackerel -31 -47 
SA Fisheries 1357 1134 1840 13 572 (100%) 
Source: Based on author's calculations using methodology described in text 
The Hake fishery generated the most rent in the South African fisheries in 2004, 
followed by the Small Pelagic, West Coast Rock Lobster and Squid fisheries 
respectively. The Horse Mackerel fishery generated a negative rent, reflecting the 
depressed state of this fishery and its associated market. The Hake Longline fishery 
also generated a negative rent, the most likely cause being the relatively high levels 
of capital stock in the fishery that increases the capital:output ratio and hence the 
opportunity cost of capital in the fishery as a whole. 
15 This table reflects the implications of differing opportunity costs of capital (OCC). 
A fishery typically involves a substantial investment in vessels and processing works. 
The opportunity cost of this investment (the amount it would yield at the market rate 
of interest) is the major component of normal profit and therefore has to be subtracted 
before rents can be assessed. 
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Both Rock Lobster fisheries generate extremely high rents per ton - several times the 
value generated by any of the other fisheries. This can be partially explained by the 
high international demand for Lobster products and the associated high prices offered. 
The Squid fishery also reports a high rent value per ton. Each of these rents per ton 
dwarfs those found in the relatively low value Small Pelagic fishery and the Horse 
Mackerel fishery who's prices appear so depressed so as to make the rent per ton 
negative. 
Asset Value shows the contribution the resource makes to the fish wealth of South 
Africa. It is clear that Hake - specifically that component fished by the Deep Sea 
Trawl fishery - is the most valuable fish stock, followed by Small Pelagics and the 
West Coast Rock Lobster. Although South Coast Rock Lobster provides the most rent 
per ton of all of the species, the low volume caught lowers its overall contribution to 
South Africa's fisheries. 
An anecdotal indication of the price of quota traded in the South African market 
suggests that West Coast Rock Lobster Quota fetches a price of around R35 per 
kilogram while trawl hake quota fetches a price of between R1.50 and R2.00 per 
kilogram 16 and hake longline, a price of between R8 and R20 per kilogram. At these 
prices, a "market-price" assessment of the resource rent of these fisheries indicate that 
the resource rent for West Coast Rock Lobster is around R140 million17 while the 
resource rent for Deep Sea Trawl Hake is between R200 million and R266 million18 
and between R78 million and R196 million19 for the Hake Longline Fishery. 
While this method will typically understate the resource rent, the results for Deep Sea 
Trawl and WCRL are around 50 per cent of the rent calculated using the "residual 
16 Some hake operators are allegedly paying R3-50 per kilogram which is estimated to be 
economically impossible by most legitimate operators ~ the only way the buyer can benefit from the 
purchase of quota at that price is if they use it to catch "extra" or unreported fish (pers com: lapp, 
2006). 
17 R3 500/ton multiplied by the WCRL catch of 4025 tons 
18 RI 500 ~ R2 OOO/ton multiplied by the Hake Deep Sea Trawl catch of 133000 tons. 
19 R8 000 ~ R20 OOO/ton multiplied by the Hake Longline catch of 9798 tons 
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value" method.2o This result seems significantly lower than it should be, although this 
is more likely due to distortions in the market for quota reflecting, amongst other: a 
lack of competition, transaction costs and unequal power between buyer and seller. 
As such, the market-price method of rent evaluation appears to be relatively 
inaccurate in the South Africa fisheries. 
11. RESOURCE RENT RECOVERED THROUGH TAXES 
As the previous section shows, South Africa's fish resources generate substantial rent. 
Much, if not all of this rent, could theoretically be recovered by the State through 
levies and taxes. 
This rent recovery could remove some of the incentive for over fishing and move the 
fishery to the most environmentally efficient equilibrium. The literature on the 
Namibian fishery (Lange, 2003) also shows how recovery of rent can promote equity 
by "recovering excess profits obtained from a national asset which can be used for 
development that benefits (for example) all Namibians not just the few involved in the 
fishing industry." 
Theoretically, rent recovery by the State could also create incentives to encourage the 
most profitable, or economically efficient equilibrium. Many economists would, 
however, maintain that the private sector would be better equipped to invest these 
rents than the State would. 
Table 12 details the degree to which resource rent is recovered, though taxation, by 
the South African government. 
20 The residual method of rent calculation presents a negative resource rent for the longline industry, 
while the "market-price" assessment indicates that the resource rent is significantly positive. This 
dichotomy could be explained by the extreme size of the capital stock, relative to the fishery's output, 
which - via an opportunity cost effect - lowers the rent estimate in the residual method's equation. 
40 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Table 12 
Resource Rent Levies Paid by Percent of rent 
(mil) -10% oee Fishery (R mil) recovered by levies 
Hake 551 29 5.3 
Deep Sea Trawl 431 25 5.9 
Inshore Trawl 63 2 3.0 
Longline -14 2 nla 
Small Pelagics 310 12 3.9 
WCRL 297 7 2.3 
SCRL 36 2 6.4 
Squid 117 6 4.8 
Horse Mackerel -31 1 nla 
SA Fisheries 1357 57 4.2 
Source: LTRAMP, 2005 
It is clear that a very small proportion - on average, less than 5% - of resource rent is 
recovered by the State. A recent study of the Namibian fisheries (Lange, 2003) found 
that the relatively low rate of rent recovery in that country was due to the "failure to 
index quota levies to inflation" (13). 
Whether this is the case in South Africa is uncertain, although the State's rent 
recovery is a degree of magnitude lower than that in Namibia. Throughout the 
Nineties the cross-species rent recovery in Namibia ranged from 18 to 51 per cent (loc 
cit) whereas South Africa's is below 5 per cent for 2004. 
12. MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF RENT DISSIPATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICAN FISHERIES 
Fisheries managers in South Africa face a choice: they can cultivate a lean efficient 
profitable fisheries sector, which can be taxed to yield revenues that provide 
employment and meet development objectives elsewhere in the system. Alternatively 
they can coerce the industry into a higher cost, less efficient, but more labour-using 
system. Despite these efficiency losses, this approach may create jobs directly and can 
benefit those who have traditionally depended on the industry. 
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Put another way, by maximising rent, through the constraint of fishing effort, the 
fisheries managers will, theoretically, limit the number of direct jobs in the industry. 
They will, however, also maximise the potential rent available for extraction through 
levies and taxes. 
Fisheries managers may, of course, choose to allow effort levels that may exceed the 
point where resource rent is maximised, presumably sacrificing tax income for direct 
job creation or wealth redistribution or to allow for stock recovery. It is essential that 
these managers have the information required to make such decisions. Currently this 
information is obtained largely by the scientists of MCM who are mostly funded by 
the State and indirectly by the fishing industry through taxes or levies. 
Due to "open-access" nature of fisheries resources, managers will almost always have 
to constrain fishing effort to some degree to ensure the sustainability of the resource. 
That said, by relaxing the constraint on fishing effort by some degree they may be 
able to increase yields, to a degree, and presumably also increase employment. The 
cost here will be borne by the decreased rents realised by the industry and the lost 
opportunities in the extraction of levies and taxes. 
Regional evidence, summarised by Lange (2003), suggests that the value of 
Namibia's fish assets increased by 37% between 1990 and 2000. This is attributed to 
"the partial recovery of some fisheries and improvements in management that have 
increased the rent generated." Limitations in reported year-on-year data mean that it 
is currently impossible to assess the South African fisheries in a similar fashion. 
It is clear that South Africa needs to enhance its reporting of fisheries data in order to 
establish "comprehensive economics accounts" that integrate the value of natural 
resources into the existing national accounting framework through the establishment 
of satellite accounts. 
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Once such accounts are established21 fisheries managers will be able to make more 
informed decisions regarding the allowable fishing effort and will have a view of the 
"total asset value" that will assist in the sustainable management of stocks. 
By including an assessment of resource rent in the metrics used to manage South 
Africa's fisheries, the State could eventually identify a target potential rent that could 
be captured by the fisheries and - by managing effort to maximise this rent - could 
manage the stocks in order to raise catch-per-unit-effort, corporate profits, sustainable 
yields and tax takes. To the extent that research and management will be necessary to 
rehabilitate the resource, the burden of the associated costs can be justifiably shared. 
21 Changes stock levels will only be available ex-post, and then only once the available data has 
worked its way through the models iterative models that drive the OMPs. This means that once the 
satellite accounts are in place they will (as in normal in national accounts) face at least three or four 
years of adjustment before the rent estimates stabilise. 
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APPENDIX 1 
1. SA Fisheries 
2004 
Number of companies 
Stock Estimate (t) 
Recruitment & Mortality changes 2004 (t) 
Catch - Butterworth (t) 
Price (R/ton) 
Jobs 
Output (turnover generated by catch) (t) 
Compensation of employees (R) 
Capital Stock (R) 
Intermediate Consumption 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
2. Hake 
2004 
Number of companies 
Stock Estimate (t) 
Recruitment & Mortality changes 2004 (t) 
Catch - Butterworth (t) 
Price (R/ton) 
Jobs 
Output (turnover generated by catch) (t) 
Compensation of employees (R) 
Capital Stock (R) 
Intermediate Consumption 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
3. Hake - Breakdown 
Hake Deep 2004 Sea Trawl 
Number of companies 
Catch - Butterworth (t) 
Price (R/ton) 
53 
133,001 
1,210 
SA Fisheries 
1,432 
7,213,221 
896,610 
737,648 
7,942 
81,736 
5,858,569,161 
1,998,776,953 
2,235,121,423 
2,050,499,206 
228,571,429 
10% 
1,357,209,431 
20% 
1,133,697,288 
Total Hake 
260 
460,634 
130,841 
154,403 
14,498 
34,477 
2,238,581,421 
655,278,405 
1,054,964,457 
783,503,497 
142,857,143 
10% 
551,445,931 
20% 
445,949,485 
Hake Inshore Hake Longline Trawl 
17 141 
10,004 9,798 
18,240 398 
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Jobs 
Output (turnover generated by 
catch) (t) 
Compensation of employees 
(R) 
Capital Stock (R) 
Intermediate Consumption 
Consume.tion of Fixed Cae.ital 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
4. Small Pelagics 
2004 
Number of companies 
Stock Estimate (t) 
19,017 
1,812,482,906 
543,635,569 
890,121,630 
634,369,017 
114£285J14 
10% 
431,180,443 
20% 
342[168[280 
Recruitment & Mortality changes 2004 (t) 
Catch - Butterworth (t) 
Price (R/ton) 
Jobs 
Output (turnover generated by catch) (t) 
Compensation of employees (R) 
Capital Stock (R) 
Intermediate Consumption 
Consume.tion of Fixed Cae.ital 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
5. WCRL 
2004 
Number of companies 
Stock Estimate (t) 
Recruitment & Mortality changes 2004 (t) 
Catch - Butterworth (t) 
Price (R/ton) 
Jobs 
Output (turnover generated by catch) (t) 
Compensation of employees (R) 
Capital Stock (R) 
Intermediate Consumption 
4,558 10,902 
188, 947J57 174,609,536 
51,597,371 59,680,047 
50,034,247 114,808,580 
66,131J15 61,113,338 
2£857£143 57£142£857 
10% 10% 
63,358,103 (14,807,563) 
20% 20% 
58[354[679 (26[288[4211 
Small Pelagics 
109 
6,027,073 
756,564 
563,910 
3,550 
11,148 
2,001,720,328 
873,884,399 
603,677,228 
700,602,115 
57£142£857 
10% 
309,723,234 
20% 
249[355[511 
Total WCRL 
910 
24,825 
1,459 
4,025 
209,473 
16,286 
843,127,338 
219,255,962 
150,863,912 
295,094,568 
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Consumption of Fixed Capital 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
6. SCRL 
2004 
Number of companies 
Stock Estimate (t) 
Recruitment & Mortality changes 2004 (t) 
Catch - Butterworth (t) 
Price (R/ton) 
Jobs 
Output (turnover generated by catch) (t) 
Compensation of employees (R) 
Capital Stock (R) 
Intermediate Consumption 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
7. Squid 
2004 
Number of companies 
Stock Estimate (t) 
Recruitment & Mortality changes 2004 (t) 
Catch - Butterworth (t) 
Price (R/ton) 
Jobs 
Output (turnover generated by catch) (t) 
Compensation of employees (R) 
Capital Stock (R) 
Intermediate Consumption 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
Opportunity cost of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
10% 
296,547,560 
20% 
281,461,168 
SCRL 
17 
2,643 
236 
382 
303,532 
2,160 
115,949,255 
33,779,114 
24,231,122 
40,582,239 
2,857,143 
10% 
36,307,647 
20% 
33,884,535 
Squid 
118 
7,458 
4,606 
7,273 
79,368 
9,413 
577,271,661 
176,890,215 
241,757,977 
202,045,082 
57,142,857 
10% 
117,017,710 
20% 
92,841,913 
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8. Ilorsc Mackerel 
2004 
Number of companie~ 
Stock E~timate (t) 
Recruitment & Mortality changes 2004 (t) 
Catch - Butterworth (t) 
Price (R/ton) 
}ob~ 
Output (turnover generated by catch) (t) 
Compensation of employees (R) 
Capital Stock (R) 
Intermediate Con~umption 
Consumption of Fixed capitill 
Opportunity co~t of capital 
RESOURCE RENT 
Opportunity cost of capit,,1 
RESOURCE RENT 
APPE~DlX 2 
Horse Mackerel 
,~ 
690,588 
2,904 
7,655 
10,701 
8,251 
81,919,157 
39,688,859 
159,628,727 
28,671,705 
28,571,429 __ 
10% 
(30,975, 508) 
20% 
(46, 938,181) 
Figure 5. The pi lchard value chain represented graphica lly 
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Figure 6. The horse mackerel (round) value chain represented graphically. 
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